Abstract. Certificate-based signature (CBS) is an attractive paradigm since it simultaneously solves the certificate revocation problem in conventional signatures and the key escrow problem in ID-based signatures. In particular, short certificate-based signatures are useful in bandwidth reduction for communication due to their short signature lengths. However, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme. Recently, to solve this problem, Li et al. proposed an efficient SCBS scheme. However, in this article, we will show that Li et al.'s scheme is insecure against Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) under an accredited security model. Moreover, we propose a new SCBS scheme with provable security. Based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, we demonstrate that our SCBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the same accredited security model. When compared with previous SCBS schemes, our scheme is the first provably secure SCBS scheme while retaining efficiency.
Introduction
In conventional public-key system (PKS) settings [1, 2] , a trusted certificate authority (CA) issues public key certificates to provide un-forgeable and trusted links between the identities and the public keys of the users. Therefore, a public key infrastructure (PKI) is required to manage and maintain certificates of all the users. In such a system, anyone who wants to verify signatures of other entities must verify their authorized public key certificates beforehand to ensure that these public keys are still valid. Hence, the certificate management is generally considered to be costly, when adopted in a PKI.
To simplify the certificate management, Shamir [3] introduced the concept of identity (ID)-based publickey system (ID-PKS) setting. Until 2001, Boneh and Franklin [4] proposed the first practical ID-PKS setting and ID-based encryption (IBE) scheme. In their ID-PKS setting, a user's public key is determined by some identity information such as social security number, e-mail address, and name. This avoids the necessity of certificates, and associates an implicitly verified public key to each user. A trusted private key generator (PKG) with a master secret key is responsible to generate and send each user a private key via a secure channel. However, since the PKG * Corresponding author knows each user's private key, it can generate signatures on behalf of any user, or decrypt any ciphertexts sent to any user. Hence, the key escrow property becomes an inherent problem in the ID-PKS setting, so that ID-PKS setting is only suitable for a closed organization where the PKG is fully trusted by everyone in the group.
To solve the key escrow problem in the ID-PKS setting, Al-Riyami and Paterson [5] presented a new paradigm, called certificateless PKS (CL-PKS) setting, which eliminates the usage of certificates in the conventional PKS settings. In the CL-PKS setting, there are two roles, namely, the key generation center (KGC) and users. A user independently generates a public/secret key pair, and the KGC generates a partial private key in accordance with the identity of the user and then sends it to the user via a secure channel. To decrypt a message, a user requires both her/his secret key and the associated partial private key. Note that the KGC does not know any user's secret key so that it is unable to impersonate a user or decrypt the ciphertexts sent to a user. Therefore, the CL-PKS setting solves the key escrow problem in the ID-PKS setting by eliminating the usage of certificates in the conventional PKS setting. However, due to the lack of public key certificates, both the ID-PKS and CL-PKS settings must provide additional revocation mechanisms [6−9] . In 2003, Gentry [10] introduced the notion of certificate-based PKS (CB-PKS) setting, which resolves the inherent key escrow problem in ID-PKS setting and the certificate revocation problem in the conventional PKS. In Gentry's scheme, a certificate acts as a partial private key as well. A user independently generates her/his public/secret key pair and sends the public key to a trusted certificate authority (CA). Then the CA generates a certificate for the user by the user's public key and some additional identity information Since then, the CA updates the certificate periodically. To sign a message or decrypt a ciphertext, the user requires both her/his secret key and an up-to-date certificate. Since the CA is unable to obtain the secret key of any user, the key escrow problem will not take place in the CB-PKS setting. Meanwhile, CB-PKS setting also solves the certificate revocation problem. Table 1 lists the comparisons among the conventional PKS [1, 2] , ID-PKS [4] , CL-PKS [5] , and CB-PKS [10] settings in terms of averting the key escrow problem, revocable functionality, the level of trust placed on the CA/PKG/KGC and certificate validation before encrypting and verifying. It is obvious that the ID-PKS setting suffers from the key escrow problem. For the level of trust placed on the CA/PKG/KGC, the CB-PKS setting is better than the others. Except for the conventional PKS and the CB-PKS settings, the other settings remove the need of certificates. In the conventional PKS settings, the users can verify illegal or compromised users by referring to the certificate revocation list (CRL). In the ID-PKS and CL-PKS settings, the PKG/KGC adopts a secure channel to transmit the private keys to non-revoked users periodically [4, 5] . In the CB-PKS setting, the CA updates the certificates via a public channel. According to Table 1 , the CB-PKS construction possesses the advantages of both ID-PKS (implicit certification) and conventional PKS (no escrow) settings while it does not need a secure channel for revocation. In the conventional PKS setting, before verifying a signature by the signer's public key, one needs to verify the signer's certificate issued by the CA to guarantee the validation of the signer's public key. Due to additional computation time and storage, the certificates in conventional PKS settings are costly to use and manage.
Motivation
Digital signature is one important cryptographic primitive, which provides the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation of messages. Indeed, authentication (identification) schemes [11−15] may be implemented by employing signature schemes. With the rapid growth of wireless communications, clients (users) often use handheld wireless devices to access remote servers via open network channels. When cryptographic mechanisms are involved in wireless environments, these wireless devices are generally resource-constrained because they possess low-power energy and limited computing capability. In this case, numerous data bits of communication and cryptographic operations with expensive computations would become heavy load for wireless devices. Hence, it is a critical issue to alleviate the communication and computational load of wireless devices. For wireless devices such as smart card, PDA, cell phone, RFID chip and sensor, message communication consumes more time and energy than computation does. To transmit one bit of data requires more energy than to execute one 32-bit instruction [16] . Therefore, reducing the number of communication bits becomes an important issue for cryptographic mechanisms executed on wireless devices.
Since the usage of short signature aims at the reduction of communication bandwidth, it is suitable for wireless environments. In 2001, Boneh et al. [17] constructed the first short signature scheme from bilinear pairings in conventional PKS setting. It is half the size of a DSA signature with a similar level of security. Afterwards, several concrete short signature schemes [18, 19] were proposed in the standard model (without random oracles). On the other hand, several researchers [20−23] also proposed short certificateless signature schemes in CL-PKS setting. However, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure short certificate-based signature (SCBS). Recently, to solve this problem, Li et al. [24] proposed an efficient SCBS scheme. However, in this article, we will show that Li et al.'s scheme is insecure against Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity). Moreover, we will propose the first provably secure SCBS scheme.
Related work
Following Gentry's [10] concept, in 2004, Kang et al. [25] proposed the first certificate-based signature (CBS) scheme which is derived from bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. In 2007, Li et al. [26] [28] showed that Liu et al.'s first scheme was insecure and proposed an improved scheme. Meanwhile, Wu et al. [29] also proposed an improved CBS scheme. However, the signature sizes of all the CBS schemes mentioned above are more than one group element.
In 2011, Liu et al. [30] proposed the first short certificate-based signature (SCBS) scheme. Unfortunately, Cheng et al. [31] showed that their scheme is insecure against a Type I adversary under an accredited security model defined in [26] [27] [28] . Recently, Li et al. [24] proposed a new SCBS scheme. However, the security model of Li et al.'s scheme is weaker than the accredited security model [26−28] in the sense that a Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) can extract neither singer's secret key nor certificate of a target entity. Hence, it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure SCBS scheme under the accredited security model.
Contribution
In this article, we first show that Li et al.'s SCBS scheme [24] is insecure against a Type I adversary under the accredited security model in [26−28] . To achieve our goal, we redefine the framework of SCBS schemes, in which the public key of a user is determined by both the user and the CA. In the accredited security model [26−28] , an adversary can extract either a singer's secret key or the associated certificate of a target entity. Finally, we propose the first provably secure SCBS signature scheme in the random oracle model [32, 33] . Our scheme has the following features. Firstly, as compared with the previously proposed CBS and SCBS schemes, our scheme enjoys lower communication bandwidth while retaining computation efficiency. Secondly, the proposed scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. Lastly, to the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first provable secure SCBS scheme under the accredited security model in [26−28] .
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction for bilinear pairings and security assumption. In Section 3, we redefine the framework and security notions for SCBS schemes. In section 4, we review Li et al. ' s SCBS scheme and show how a Type I adversary can successfully attack their scheme. Our concrete SCBS scheme is given in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyze the security of our scheme. Comparisons are demonstrated in Section 7. Finally, we draw a conclusion in Section 8.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly present some properties of bilinear pairings and a relevant security assumption [4] .
Bilinear pairings
Let G and G T be additive and multiplicative cyclic groups of the same prime order q, respectively. An admissible bilinear pairing is a map ê: GG G T with the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: for P, QG and a, bZ q * , the map ê satisfies the equality ê(aP, bQ)ê(P, Q) ab . 2. Non-degeneracy: there exist P, QG such that ê (P, Q)1. 3. Computability: for all P, QG, ê (P, Q) can be computed efficiently.
Security assumption
Here, we present a hard mathematical problem and define its corresponding assumption.
given P, aP, bPG with uniformly random choices of a, bZ q * , the CDH problem is to compute abP. 
Framework and adversarial model of SCBS

Framework
We present the framework of short certificatebased signature (SCBS) schemes depicted in Fig.1 , which is modified from that of the CBS scheme in [26−28] . Our framework is slightly different from that of the conventional CBS schemes in the sense that the full public key of a user is generated by both the user and the CA. A SCBS scheme is specified by five algorithms, namely, Setup, User key generation, Certificate generation, Sign and Verify algorithms.  Setup is a probabilistic algorithm run by the CA that takes a security parameter as input, and returns a master secret key and public parameters PP. PP is made public and available for all the other algorithms.  User key generation is a probabilistic algorithm run by a user that takes as input the user's identity ID, and outputs the secret key S ID and the partial public key P ID .  Certificate generation is a probabilistic algorithm run by the CA that takes as input the master secret key, the public parameters PP, a user's identity ID and partial public key P ID , and returns the user's certificate C ID and (full) public key PK ID =(P ID , R ID ) to the user, and publishes (ID, PK ID ) in a public directory.  Sign is a deterministic algorithm run by a user that takes as input the user's secret key S ID , certificate C ID and a message M, and returns a signature σ.  Verify is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a message M, a signature σ, a user's identity ID with the public key PK ID , and outputs either "accept" or "reject". 
Security model
Based on the security model of CBS schemes in [26−28] , we define "existential unforgeability of short certificate-based signatures against adaptive chosenmessage attacks" (UF-SCBS-ACM). In UF-SCBS-ACM attacks, the security notions for SCBS schemes include two types of adversaries, namely, Type I and Type II adversaries with different query capabilities. A Type I adversary A I acts as an uncertified entity who does not have access to the master secret key s so that it cannot obtain the certificate of a target entity. A Type II adversary A II models the malicious CA who owns the master secret key s, but cannot obtain the secret key of the target entity. The security notions for SCBS schemes are modeled by the following two games (Games 1 and 2) between a challenger C and the two types of adversaries.
Definition 2. (UF-SCBS-ACM).
A SCBS scheme offers existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message (UF-SCBS-ACM) attacks if no PPT adversary A of Type I or Type II has a nonnegligible advantage in the following two games (Games 1 and 2) played between a challenger C and the adversary A.
Game 1 (for Type I adversary, AI)
 Setup. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to produce a master secret key s and a list of public parameters PP. PP is given to A I and s is kept secret by C.  Queries. The adversary A I may issue a number of different queries to the challenger C in an adaptive manner as follows.
-User key generation (ID). The challenger C runs the User key generation algorithm to return the user's partial public key P ID to A I .
-Certificate generation (ID, P ID ). The challenger 
Review and weakness of Li et al.'s SCBS scheme
Recently, Li et al. [24] presented a SCBS scheme and claimed their scheme is secure against both Type I and Type II adversaries in the random oracle model. However, the security model of Li et al.'s scheme is weaker than the accredited security model in [26−28] . In their model, a Type I adversary (i.e. uncertified entity) extracts neither the secret key nor the certificate of a target entity. On the contrary, the accredited security model allows an adversary to obtain either the secret key (Type I adversary) or the certificate (Type II adversary) of a target entity as described in Games 1 and 2 in Section 3. In this section, we show that their scheme is insecure in the presence of Type I adversary under the accredited security model. In the following, we first review Li et al.'s SCBS scheme. [30] and pointed out that it is still a challenging and open problem to design a secure SCBS scheme.
Li et al.'s SCBS scheme
Our SCBS scheme
The proposed SCBS scheme consists of five algorithms, namely, Setup, User key generation, Certificate generation, Sign and Verify algorithms. 2. Verify the equality ê(P,)ê(P ID , U 1 )·ê(R ID +h·P pub , U 2 ). If it holds, output "accept". Otherwise, output "reject". Here, the correctness of the equality in Step (2) of the Verify algorithm follows since
Security analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis of the proposed SCBS scheme. Theorems 1 and 2, respectively, show that the proposed scheme is secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in the UF-SCBS-ACM games (Games 1 and 2) presented in Definition 3. 
Performance comparisons and discussions
In the following, we first define several timeconsuming operations. 
Conclusions
In this article, we demonstrate that Li et al.'s SCBS scheme is insecure against the attacks of Type I adversary under an accredited security model. We also propose the first provably secure SCBS scheme in the random oracle model. In the accredited security model, the adversary is allowed to issue the Sign query even though the challenger does not hold the corresponding secret key and the certificate of the user. This is the strongest capability that an adversary can possess in SCBS schemes. Moreover, due to the short signature length, our SCBS scheme is well suited for low-bandwidth communication environments with high-level security.
